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Symbols are the more powerful the more meanings they are able to admit. They 
actually live on ambivalence. The Cross, for instance, counted both as a token of 
victory for conquerors and as a token of hope for the vanquished. That 
ambivalence raised it above the fray; a single clear message would have meant 
that it divided rather than united. The same may be said of the image of the blue 
planet, now a symbol unchallenged by either Left or Right, conservative or 
liberal. Whatever their differences, they are all fond of adorning themselves with 
this symbol of our epoch. To fall in with it is to announce that one is abreast of 
the times, in tune with the world, focused on the future, truly prepared to set off 
into the new century. In this picture are condensed the opposing ambitions of 
our age. It is hoisted like a flag by troops from enemy camps, and its prominence 
results from this plurality of meaning. The photograph of the globe contains the 
contradictions of globalization. That is why it could become an all-weather icon. 
 
No sooner had it become available, in the late 1960s, than the international 
environmental movement recognized itself in it. For nothing stands out from the 
picture as clearly as the round margin that sets it off from the dark cosmos. 
Clouds, oceans and land masses gleam in the wan light; the earth appears to the 
observer as a cosy island in a universe unfriendly to life, holding all the 
continents, seas and living species. For the environmental movement the 
picture=s message was plain: it revealed the earth in its finitude. That circular 
object made it obvious that the ecological costs of industrial progress could not 
be shifted forever to Noplace, that they were slowly building up into a threat to 
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all within a closed system. In the end, the externalization of costs belonged to 
the realm of the impossible. In a finite world, where everyone was affected by 
everyone else, there was an urgent need for mutual care and attention, for more 
thought about the consequences of one=s actions. Such was the holistic message 
B and, certainly, it was not without some effect. Since the days when a few 
minorities launched their appeal so full of foreboding, the image of the planet as 
a closed system has steadily gained currency and even recognition in 
international law. The conventions on ozone, world climate and biodiversity 
prove that the perception of the earth=s bio-physical limits has attained the 
supreme political consecration. 
 
For some time, however, ecologists have no longer had a monopoly on the 
image. At various airports, in the endless passageways between check-in and 
exit, a well-lit publicity board has been visible in recent years that strikingly 
expresses a different view of globalization. It shows the blue planet pushing 
itself on the observer from its blueBblack background, with a laconic text: 
>MasterCard. The World in Your Hands.= The hurrying passengers are being told 
that, wherever they fly in this big wide world, they can count on the services of 
their cards and slot themselves into a global credit and debit network. The 
credit-card empire stretches out across all frontiers, with purchasing power in 
any location and accounting in real time, and its electronic money transfers 
ensure that the traveller is always provided for. In these and numerous other 
variations, the image of the planet has turned since the 1980s into an emblem of 
transnational business; hardly any company in telecommunications or tourism B 
not to speak of the news industry B seems able to manage without it. 
 
This has been possible because the picture also contains quite a different 
message. In its detachment from the pitch-black cosmos, the terrestrial sphere 
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stands out as a unified area whose continuous physical reality causes the 
frontiers between nations and polities to disappear B hence the visual message 
that what counts is perhaps the boundaries of the earth, but certainly not political 
frontiers. Only oceans, continents 
and islands can be seen, with no trace of nations, cultures or states. 
 
In the picture of the globe, distances are measured exclusively in geographical 
units of miles or kilometres, not in social units of closeness and foreignness. The 
satellite photographs generally look like renaturalized maps, seeming to confirm 
the old cartographical postulate that places are nothing more than intersections 
of two lines B the lines of longitude and latitude. In marked contrast to the 
globes of the nineteenth century, which sharply delineate political frontiers and 
often use different colours for different territories, any social reality is here 
dissipated into morphology. The earth is depicted as a homogeneous area 
offering no resistance to transit B or only resistance caused by geographical 
features, not to human communities and their laws, customs or purposes. Every 
point of the hemisphere turned towards the observer can be seen at the same 
moment, and this simultaneous access of the human gaze suggests the idea of 
unobstructed access on the ground too. The image of the planet offers the world 
up for unrestricted movement, promises access in every direction, and seems to 
present no obstacle to expansionism other than the limits of the globe itself. 
Open, continuous and controllable B there is an imperial 
message too in the photographs of the earth. 
 
The image symbolizes limitation in the physical sense and expansion in the 
political sense. Little wonder, then, that it can serve as a banner for both 
environmental groups and transnational corporations. It has become the symbol 
of our times across all the rival world views, because it brings to life both sides 
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of the basic conflict that runs through our epoch. On the one hand, the ecological 
limits of the earth stand out more clearly than ever before; on the other hand, the 
dynamic of economic globalization pushes for the removal of all boundaries 
associated with political and cultural space (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996). The 
two narratives of globalization B limitation and expansion B have acquired a 
clearer form over the past three decades and fight it out in both the arena of 
theory and the arena of politics. The outcome of this struggle will decide the 
shape of the new century. 
 
The Rise of the Transnational Economy 
Since the mid-1970s, when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
gave way to floating parities determined by the market, the world economy has 
witnessed the collapse of boundaries in a process that started slowly but has 
gradually speeded up. Of course, the quest for raw materials and markets had for 
centuries been impelling capitalist companies beyond their national frontiers, but 
only in the last few decades has an international order been created that works 
programmatically 
towards a transnational economy with open borders. Whereas all the first eight 
GATT rounds since the war dismantled more and more tariff obstacles to the 
exchange of goods, in line with the traditional ideal of free trade, the last of 
these, the Uruguay Round, and the newly constructed World Trade Organization 
have laid the legal foundations for politically unregulated movement of goods, 
services, money capital and investment right across the globe. The Uruguay 
Round, concluded in 1993, drew more widely the circle of freely tradable 
commodities and also deregulated >software products= such as planning 
contracts, copyrights, patents and insurance. Controls on the movement of 
capital, allowing easier inward and outward financial flows, have been 
progressively removed over the past 20 years, 
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first in the USA and Germany, then in the mid-1980s in Japan, and finally in the 
countries of the South. In order to make foreign investors feel more at home 
everywhere, the WTO (and the OECD with its provisionally stalled multilateral 
investment agreement) have imposed on each state an obligation to accord at 
least the same rights to foreign as to domestic investors. 
 
A Utopian energy is at work in all these initiatives. This can be seen in the ever 
more frequently declared intention to create a >level playing field=, a global arena 
for economic competition in which only efficiency counts, unfettered and 
undistorted by any special local traditions or structures. All economic players 
are supposed to have the right B at any place and any time B to offer, produce 
and acquire whatever they want. Up to now, this free play of the market has 
been hindered by the dizzying diversity of the world=s social and legal orders, 
which have grown out of each country=s history and social structure. The aim 
now, therefore, is to wrench economic activities from their embeddedness in 
local or national conditions and to bring them under the same rules (if any) 
everywhere in the world. There should be no blocking, weakening or interfering 
with market forces, because that leads to efficiency losses and suboptimal 
welfare. 
 
This Utopian model of economic globalization also features the earth as a 
homogeneous area, to be crossed at will by circulating goods and capital. Only 
supply and demand, and in no case political priorities, are supposed to speed up 
or slow down these flows and to point them in the right direction. The world is 
conceived as a single huge market-place, where factors of production are bought 
at their cheapest (>global sourcing=) and commodities are sold at their highest 
obtainable price (>global marketing=). Just as in satellite pictures of the planet, no 
role is played by states and their particular laws; places where people live are 
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foreshortened to mere locations of economic activity. And yet, to the continual 
annoyance of the neo-liberal heaven-stormers, societies everywhere prove 
sluggish and resistant. The globalizers thus have the onerous task of adapting 
base reality to ideal model; their mission is tirelessly to overcome obstacles to 
the free flow of commodities and thus to make the world comprehensively 
accessible. That is precisely the programme of the WTO=s multilateral economic 
regime. 
 
In the last few decades, of course, a material infrastructure has also been created 
for transnational integration. Without the global network of telephone lines, 
glass fibre cables, microwave channels, relay stations and communications 
satellites, there would be no open-border world B or at least not as a routine part 
of everyday life. For electronic data flows B which can be converted into 
commands and information, 
sounds and images B eat up kilometres at the press of a key or the click of a 
mouse. Geographical distance ceases to be of any significance, and since the 
costs of the transfer and processing of data have dramatically fallen, worldwide 
interaction has become the daily bread of globally oriented middle classes. Thus, 
electronic impulses translate what the external view of the planet already 
suggested: the unity of space and time for any action in the world. In principle, 
all events can now be brought into relation with one another in real time for all 
parts of the earth. Whereas the picture of the globe conveyed the absence of 
boundaries as a visual experience, electronic networking converts it into a 
communications (and air transport into a travel) experience. The constant high-
volume, lightning-fast flow of bits of information around the globe achieves the 
abolition of distance as well as the compression of time; electronic space 
produces a spatio-temporally 
compact globe (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996). 
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The information highways may be compared to the railways: the digital network 
is to the rise of a global economy what the railway network was in the 
nineteenth century to the rise of a national economy (Lash and Urry 1994). Just 
as the railway infrastructure became the backbone of the national economy 
(because falling transport costs enabled regional markets to fuse into a national 
market), so the digital infrastructure is the backbone of the global economy, 
because falling transmission costs enable national markets to fuse into a global 
market. Distance is not, of course, truncated in the same way everywhere in the 
world. This results in a new hierarchy of space: the >global cities= stand at the top 
of the pyramid, closely bound together across frontiers by high-speed air and 
land links and by glass fibre cables, while at the bottom whole regions or even 
continents B Africa or Central Asia, for example B constitute >black holes= in the 
informational universe (Castells 
1997), not connected to one another in any significant degree. 
 
On closer examination, then, the networks of transnational interaction rarely 
assume configurations that stretch across the whole planet; they are not global 
but transnational, because they bind together only shifting segments of the earth. 
They are deterritorialized rather than globalized. Unlike earlier types of 
internationalization, this is particularly the case for the characteristic economic 
forms of the global age B geographically extended chains of value creation and 
global finance markets. Basing themselves upon an infrastructure of electronic 
and physical traffic, companies are now in a position to split up their value-
creation process and locate individual parts in areas of the world with the most 
advantageous wage, skill or market environment. Thus, for a product taken at 
random, the early stages may take place in Russia, the further processing in 
Malaysia, the marketing in Hong Kong, the research in Switzerland, and the 
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design in England. Instead of the traditional factory where products were largely 
manufactured from beginning to end, a network of partial locations makes it 
possible for previously unheard-of efficiency gains to be achieved. The textbook 
case of collapsing frontiers, however, is provided by the operations of finance 
markets. Shares, loans and currency stocks have long left >paper= behind and 
become digitalized; their owners can be switched at the press of a key, quite 
regardless of borders or geographical distance. Nor is it an accident that the most 
extensively globalized market is the one that deals in the least physical of all 
commodities: money. Dependent only on an electronic impulse, it can move 
angel-like in real time anywhere within a homogeneous space. It seems as if the 
narrative of collapsing frontiers can best be translated into reality when it takes 
place within the incorporeality of cyberspace. 
 
How Economic Globalization Reduces the Use of Resources 
For the protagonists of economic globalization, there is no greater thorn in the 
side than closed economic areas. Import restrictions and export regulations, 
product standards and social legislation, investment guidance and laws on the 
sharing of profits B in short, political provisions of any kind that establish a 
difference between one country=s economic system and those of others B are 
perceived by the globalizers as so many obstacles to the free movement of the 
factors of production. 
They therefore seek to undermine, and gradually to break up altogether, the 
state-defined >containers= of national markets, and to replace them with a 
transnational arena where economic actors are no longer prevented by special 
rules and regulations from carrying through the dynamic of competition. The 
multinational economic regimes B whether geared continentally to ASEAN, 
NAFTA or the EU, or globally to GATT and the WTO B come down to the 
construction of homogeneous competitive areas stretching across nations. 
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The promise held out in these initiatives is one of a world that gets the utmost 
out of its limited means. A way has to be found of satisfying more and more 
people around the world, with more and more claims, and it is from this 
challenge that the friends of globalization derive their task B indeed, their 
mission B to subject the world=s economic apparatuses to a course of efficiency-
raising treatment. For the point of market liberalization is to ensure, through the 
selective power of competition, that capital, labour, intelligence and even natural 
resources are everywhere deployed in the most efficient manner. Only such 
treatment continually renewed, argue the globalizers, can lay the basis for the 
wealth of nations. True, companies do not act out of lofty motives but simply 
take advantage of opportunities for profits and competitive triumphs; 
nevertheless, the >invisible hand= of the market 
is expected in the end to produce greater prosperity for all, even at a world level. 
A dynamic must therefore be set in train that exposes every protected zone of 
low productivity to the bracing wind of international competition. 
 
The main targets for such a strategy are the state-run economic complexes in the 
former Soviet Union and in many countries of the South. In fact, external 
protectionism and internal sclerosis often go hand in hand, for parasitical 
structures arise most easily where power elites can use their possession of the 
state to appropriate a country=s wealth. Insulated from competition, whether 
internal or external, the power elite can get away with deploying capital and 
other resources in 
short-term operations that produce a maximum surplus B a considerable part of 
which is then stashed away in foreign bank accounts. Along with the state 
monopoly of economic activity, the pressure on workers and the underprovision 
of consumers, it is especially the frenzied exploitation of natural resources that 
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here rakes in a quick profit. Growth soon becomes synonymous with expanded 
extraction from nature: oil in the Soviet Union, Nigeria or Mexico, coal in India 
and China, wood in the Ivory Coast and Indonesia, minerals in Zaire. Of course, 
it was no accident that the use of resources in the former communist countries 
was much higher than in the West, for natural treasures were seen as a cost-free 
(because state-owned) means of fuelling industrial development B especially as 
growth pressures were directed to extensive rather than intensive ways of 
increasing production. The opening up of bureaucratically ossified economies to 
competition was thus to the benefit of resource efficiency. Almost as soon as the 
wall of restrictions and subsidies crumbled, new suppliers from outside appeared 
on the scene and placed the old wasteful economy in question. Globalization 
razes strongholds of mismanagement to the ground, and in such cases cuts down 
on the use of natural resources by enforcing at least economic rationality.  
 
This efficiency effect does not operate only through expanded entry to the 
market. Trade and investment also increase access to technologies that, in 
comparison with domestic ones, often bring considerable gains in efficiency. 
This applies in particular to such sectors as mining, energy, transport and 
industry. Examples range from the export of more economical cars from Japan 
to the United States, through the introduction of new power station technology 
in Pakistan, to the savings in material and energy that came with new blast-
furnaces in the Brazilian steel industry. There is strong evidence that more open 
national economies deploy more resource-efficient technologies at an earlier 
date, simply because they have better access to the most modern B which usually 
means more efficient B technological investment. Moreover, transnational 
corporations tend to standardize technologies between countries at a more 
advanced level, rather than expose themselves to all kinds of coordination costs. 
The connection is by no means necessary, of course, but it is probable B and it 
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may be said that more flexible investment rules generally favour entry to a 
higher technological trajectory (Johnstone 1997). The efficiency effect of more 
open markets is visible not only in supply-side technology transfers but also on 
the demand side: commodity exports from the fast-developing countries to the 
post-industrial regions of the North have to stand the test of consumer 
preferences in the North, and since the market demand there often displays 
greater environmental awareness, production structures in the exporting country 
may have to adapt to those standards. 
 
The justification for economic globalization, then, is supposed to be 
that it establishes an empire of economic efficiency, and that this effect often 
extends to the use of energy and raw materials (OECD 1998). This is understood 
as a growth in micro-economic rationality, as a striving to deploy the factors of 
production in an optimal manner everywhere. Of course, the promoters of 
globalization have to play down the fact that this can equally well go together 
with a decline in macro-rationality as regards both politicalBsocial relations and 
the environment. For market rationalization may lower the use of particular 
resources B that is, input per unit of output B but the total use of resources will 
nevertheless grow if the volume of economic activity expands. Growth effects 
may all too easily eat up efficiency effects. In fact, so far in the history of 
industrial society, efficiency gains have quite consistently been converted into 
new opportunities for expansion. This, from an ecological point of view, is the 
Achilles= heel of globalization. 
 
How Economic Globalization Expands and Accelerates the Use of 
Resources 
In recent years globalization has been hailed, often with the full redcarpet 




conventional: it serves on its own admission to spur world economic growth, 
and it involves B under changed historical conditions B such long-standing 
strategies as intensive development and growth through expansion. On the one 
hand, there is the shifting distribution of the value-creation chain across far-
flung regions of the world, which enables companies B in their choice of the best 
location for each stage of production B to enjoy to the full rationalization 
benefits that were simply not available before. The advancing digitalization of 
economic processes has also created new scope for productivity gains B for 
example, through flexible automation in manufacturing, simulation techniques 
in research, or perfectly timed logistics in networks of cooperation. With the 
restructuring of large parts of the world economy, it has thus become possible to 
wring further growth from long drawn-out productivity competition in OECD 
markets that were largely saturated at the end of the 1970s. On the other hand, 
growth has occurred through expansion B and, in particular, through the quest 
for new markets abroad. Many companies that might not have been able to make 
much further progress on local markets decided instead to tap demand in other 
OECD and fast-developing countries. The combined result of these two 
strategies may be seen in the fact that the world economy is well on its way to 
doubling between 1975 and the year 2000. Even if all GNP growth does not 
involve a parallel rise in the flow of resources, there can be no doubt that the 
biosphere is under ever greater pressure from the anthroposphere. 
 
Direct foreign investment and the expansion effect  
The Utopian horizon of globalization is a permeable borderless world in which 
goods and capital can move around freely. Whereas the various GATT 
agreements expanded the exchange of goods over a period of decades, the 




the mobility of private capital. Between 1980 and 1996 the cross-border 
exchange of goods increased by an annual average of 4.7 per cent, but foreign 
investment rose by 8.8 per cent per annum, international bank loans by 10 per 
cent, and the trade in currency and shares by 25 per cent (Economist 1997a). If 
one looks at the geographical distribution of these flows it becomes clear that, 
although the lion=s share of the capital traffic remains as before within the 
USABEUBJapan triad, transfers of private capital have sky-rocketed mainly in 
the ten >emerging markets= of East Asia and South America. They rose from an 
annual $44 billion at the beginning of the 1990s to $244 billion in 1996, before 
settling down at some $170 billion after the 1997 financial crisis in Asia (French 
1998: 7). An important sub-category B accounting for one-half in the case of 
manufacturing, more than one-third in services, and 20 per cent in the primary 
sector B has been foreign investment to buy up existing firms or to found new 
ones. For the investing company, the point of this has been to control the further 
extraction of natural resources, to erect a platform within a transnational chain of 
pro-duction, or to gain access to export markets. For the host state, on the other 
hand, the aim has been to draw in investment capital and know-how, as part of a 
fervent desire to take off economically and to catch up with the rich countries at 
some point in the future. 
 
With the migration of investment capital from the OECD countries, the fossil 
model of development has spread to the newly industrializing countries and 
even well beyond them. Whether it is a question of factories in China, chemical 
plants in Mexico or industrial agriculture in the Philippines, the countries of the 
South are entering on a broad front the resource-intensive fossil stage of 
economic development. That fateful style of economics that consolidated itself 




transformation of unpaid natural values into commodity values, is now 
expanding to more parts of the world in the wake of foreign investment. 
Certainly, a good part of this development is also being driven by locally 
accumulated capital, but the gigantic influx of foreign investment has deepened 
and accelerated the spread of B environmentally speaking B robber economies. 
Everywhere prevails an industrialBsocial mimetism, a copying of modes of 
production and consumption that, in view of the crisis of nature, may already be 
regarded as obsolete. For in the conventional path of development, monetary 
growth always goes together with material growth; a certain uncoupling of the 
two appears only in the transition to a post-industrial economy. The favoured 
targets for investment are thus precisely raw materials extraction or energy and 
transport infrastructure, which all push the use of natural resources up and up. 
Even if input per unit of output is lower than at a corresponding stage in the 
development of the rich countries, the absolute volume of the flow of resources 
has been increasing prodigiously.  
 
The removal of national obstacles to investment activity stands in an 
increasingly tense relationship with the earth=s bio-physical limitations. Thus the 
fast-industrializing countries recorded a steep rise in their CO2 emissions 
(varying between 20 and 40 per cent in the 1990B95 period), while the 
industrialized countries B at a higher level, of course B increased theirs only 
slightly (Brown et al. 1998: 58). All in all, fossil fuel use will double in China 
and East Asia between 1990 and 2005, to reach a volume almost comparable to 
that of the United States (WRI 1998: 121). The motor car may serve as a symbol 
in this respect. In South Korea (before the crisis broke), car ownership was 
expanding by 20 per cent a year (Carley and Spapens 1998: 35). On the streets 




Ambassador limousine B a real petrol-guzzler, of course, but limited in numbers 
and therefore discharging far less gas than the huge fleet of more efficient 
vehicles turned out by the nine automobile corporations now operating there. 
Thus, in countries where transport has until now been mainly a question of 
bicycles and public services, further development of their eco-friendly systems 
will be blocked and replaced by a structure dependent upon high fuel use. It is 
altogether consistent with the logic of fossil expansion that the World Bank, for 
all its lip-service to >sustainable development=, allocates two-thirds of its 
expenditure in the energy sector to the mobilization of fossil energy sources 
(Wysham 1997). 
 
Another symbol of a lifestyle widely regarded as modern, the Big Mac, may 
serve to illustrate the mounting pressure on biological resources. In little more 
than five years between 1990 and 1996, the number of McDonald=s restaurants 
in Asia and Latin America quadrupled (UNDP 1998: 56), against a background 
of tripled meat 
consumption over the past 25 years. Such trends mean more and more water, 
cereals and grazing land for cattle, so it is hardly surprising that, in the 1980s 
alone, the countries of South-East and South Asia lost between 10 per cent and 
30 per cent of their forests (Brown et al. 1998). The forest fires in Indonesia, 
whose dense clouds of smoke covered half of South-East Asia in 1997B98, 
originated in massive slash-and-burn clearances and were widely interpreted as a 
warning of the destructive power of the Asian economic miracle. 
Deregulation and the competitive effect  
The creation of a global competitive arena requires efforts not only a 
quantitative expansion but also a qualitative restructuring. Alongside the 




also appeared on the agenda of the day, for new rules of economic competition 
are indispensable if there is to be a homogeneous space no longer riven by 
national economic idiosyncrasies. There is no other way for would-be 
globalizers than to dismantle the national regulatory apparatuses that have 
previously encompassed economic activity. These apparatuses, which generally 
reflect a country=s historical experiences, social sets of interests and political 
ideals, combine the logic of economics with other social priorities, in both 
fragile compromises and institutions built to last. At a later stage of the secular 
process that Karl Polanyi called >disembedding=, the dynamic of economic 
globalization is intended to release market relations from the web of national 
norms and standards and to bring them under the law of worldwide competition. 
Whatever these norms cover B labour conditions, regional planning or 
environmental policy B they are neither wrong nor right but are seen as 
obstructing entry into the global competitive arena. In this view of things, norms 
might be acceptable at a global level B although the question does not really 
apply, of course, in the absence of a political authority. Deregulation is thus a 
catch-all term for attempts to further global competition by dissolving the links 
between economic actors and a particular place or a particular community. 
 
Like any regulation of economic activity in the name of the public interest, 
protection of the environment is also coming under pressure in many countries. 
As the number of economic actors on the global market continues to grow, so 
too does the competition between them B which is why governments everywhere 
tend to attach a higher value to competitive strength than to protection of the 
environment or of natural resources. New ecological norms, often imposed by 
democratic public opinion after years of struggle and controversy, are perceived 




As competitive interests gain the upper hand over protective interests, it 
becomes many times more difficult to halt deforestation in Canada or 
overmining in the Philippines, to stop the building of more motorways in 
Germany, to introduce eco-taxes in the European Union, or to maintain 
ecological product standards in Sweden. However, although governments are 
often enough determined to make their country a more attractive site for 
footloose capital, it is doubtless an exaggeration to speak of a >race to the 
bottom= in matters concerning environmental standards (Esty and Gerardin 
1998). Sometimes the protective interests are too strong, or it may be that 
environmental 
factors are not all that significant in a siting decision. It would be more accurate 
to say that environmental regulation has tended to get >stuck in the mud= as a 
result of increased competition (Zarsky 1997). True, world market integration 
has brought a certain convergence among national regulatory systems, but this 
has been happening too slowly and at too low a level. In many countries, the 
process of economic globalization has blocked any real progress in national 
environmental policy. 
 
Not surprisingly, the ambition to standardize competitive conditions throughout 
the world B especially in the case of cross-border trade B clashes with the right 
of individual countries to shape economic processes. Now that tariff barriers for 
industrial goods have been largely dismantled through the successive GATT 
rounds, should environmental reasons be allowed to put certain categories of 
import at a disadvantage? This question has been much disputed ever since the 
Uruguay Round, and it continues to give rise to controversy within the WTO 
and OECD over deregulation and protection interests. Under the trade rules 




health standards, so long as the same kinds of goods are subject to the same 
regulation regardless of whether they are imported or locally produced. Of 
course, this applies only to the composition of a product: a government might 
decide, for instance, to slap a special tax on all cars above a certain power 
threshold. Here, it seems, the principle of national sovereignty contradicts only 
the principle of the unregulated circulation of goods. What is forbidden in 
international trade, however, is to discriminate against goods whose production 
process does not conform to certain environmental standards. Which chemicals 
are used to produce an item of clothing, whether wooden products come from 
forest clearance areas, whether genetic engineering methods have been used to 
produce a plant B on none of these questions is a government allowed by WTO 
rules to express a collective preference. Thus, in the 
well-known tuna affair, the ban on dolphin fishing could not be maintained 
under NAFTA rules, and one of the present disputes between the USA and the 
EU is over whether governments have the right to keep hormone-intensive beef 
out of their markets. Moreover, since local production standards are also put 
under strain when importers are able to gain a competitive advantage by 
externalizing environmental costs, individual states lose the power to insist that 
production processes in their own country should be environmentally 
sustainable. The deregulation interest nullifies the protection interest. Through 
the competitive effect of free trade, even gentle course corrections towards a 
sustainable economy are soon brought to a standstill. 
 
All the deregulation efforts are also meant to cleanse the economy of extraneous 
influences, thereby ensuring optimal deployment of the factors of production. 
Consumers are ostensibly the main ones to benefit, since deregulated operations 




prices through greater competition. Nevertheless, a regime of ruthless efficiency 
in environmentally significant sectors may lead to greater overall use of 
resources. If the price of heating oil, petrol, coal or water falls, then normally 
demand for them will rise and it will be even less worth introducing 
conservation technologies. Deregulation of the electricity market in the OECD 
countries, for example, certainly helped promoters of energy-efficient power 
stations to enter the market, but it also showed that lower prices may hinder a 
changeover to cleaner energy sources such as natural gas and, more important 
still, actually encourage higher electricity consumption ( Jones and Youngman 
1997). Anyway, it is fairly easy to see that falling prices within a price system 
that does not accurately reflect environmental costs will accelerate the quarrying 
of resources. So long as prices do not tell the ecological truth, deregulation will 
only take the market further down the ecologically slippery slope B and it is not 
exactly rational to keep running more efficiently in the wrong direction. But the 
purer competition becomes as a result of deregulation, the less will ecological 
rationality be able to assert itself against economic rationality. Under the given 
price system, global competition will deepen the crisis of nature (Daly 1996). 
 
Currency crises and the sell-out effect  
Nowhere has a global com-petitive space been raised so clear of national 
boundaries as in the case of the finance markets. Goods take time to be carried 
from one place to another, foreign investment requires factories to be built or 
dismantled, and even services such as insurance cannot be traded overseas 
without a network of branches and representatives. Only financial transfers in 
the form of shares, loans or currencies are scarcely subject any longer to 
restrictions of time and space. Every day, billions of dollars change hands online 




physical distance. Only on these electronic markets does capital finally attain its 
secret ideal of completely unfettered mobility. For the money markets have very 
largely shaken 
off the inertia not only of temporal duration and geographical distance, but also 
of material goods; less than 2 per cent of the currency trade is now covered by 
actual commodity flows (Zukunftskommission 1998: 73). This virtual economy 
has been made possible technologically by electronic networking, and politically 
by the deregulation of international capital traffic in the industrialized countries 
in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in major developing countries in the 1990s. 
 
As we have seen, it was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 that 
gave the impetus to this development. Currencies could become commodities, 
their price set by the laws of supply and demand on the capital markets. But the 
value of a currency is a matter of fateful significance for a country: it determines 
the purchasing power of the national economy in relation to other national 
economies around the world. In fact, the ups and downs of freely convertible 
currencies reflect the expectations of future growth and competitiveness that 
investors entertain about the respective economies. In a way, a country=s whole 
economy thus becomes a commodity, whose relative value crystallizes through 
the return envisaged by investment fund managers. This gives the finance 
markets great power vis-à-vis economically weak countries, so great that 
fluctuations in the exchange rate can decide the fate of whole nations. 
Governments, whether democratic or authoritarian, often find themselves 
compelled to gear their economic, social and fiscal policies to the interests of 
investors, with the result that the interest of their own people in social and 
economic security all too easily goes by the board. It is as if investors cast a 




(Sassen 1996); the global electorate of investors lines up, as it were, against a 
country=s local electorate, and not infrequently the government allies itself with 
the investors against its own electors. At the same time, however, the currency 
crashes in Mexico in late 1994, in several East Asian countries in 1997, and in 
Russian and Brazil in 1998 made it plain that investors are as jumpy as a herd of 
wild horses that stampedes off now in one direction, now in another as danger 
threatens. The collective optimism with which investors forget about risks 
during an upturn is matched by the collective panic with which they flee out of 
loans and currencies during a downturn. Investment-seeking capital storms into 
countries and back out again. On its way in, it gives rise to false dreams; on its 
way out, it leaves behind ruined human lives and ravaged ecosystems (Cavanagh 
1998). 
 
Currency crises are quite likely to threaten nature in the affected countries, for 
those that are rich in exportable natural resources come under intense pressure to 
exploit them more extensively and at a faster tempo. The falling value of the 
currency means that they have to throw larger quantities onto the world market 
in order to stop their export earnings falling through the floor. An exchange-rate 
crisis thus intensifies the already chronic hunger of indebted states for foreign 
currency, so that they will be able to repay loans and to import at least the 
minimum of food, goods and capital. But often the only option left is to use 
freely available nature as a currency-earner B as one can see from the current 
boom in the export of oil, gas, metals, wood, animal feed and agricultural 
produce from countries in the South hit 
by the financial crisis. Fishing rights are being sold by Senegal, for example, to 
fleets of vessels from Asia, Canada and Europe; tree-felling rights by Chile to 




multinationals (French 1998: 23). In times of need, desperate countries have to 
flog off even their >family silver=. So it is that valuable forest land is sold off 
stretch by stretch under the pressure of the debt burden. Mexico, for instance, 
after the peso collapse of 1994, rescinded its laws protecting national forests B 
and the people living in them B in order to promote a stronger export orientation. 
Brazil launched an action plan to make the export of wood, minerals and energy 
financially more attractive through massive infrastructural investment in 
Amazonia. Indonesia, after another currency crash, was compelled in talks with 
the International Monetary Fund to change its land ownership legislation so that 
foreign cellulose and paper corporations could move in on the forest (Menotti 
1998b). One might even, as Menotti acerbically suggests, speak of a causal link 
between falling currencies and falling trees. 
 
Measures to rectify the economy after a currency and debt crisis B measures 
imposed under the often blackmailing care of the IMF structural adjustment 
programmes B also usually lead to forced selling of natural assets on the world 
market, for the aim of the numerous structural adjustment programmes in both 
the South and the East is to bring the balance of payments back into equilibrium 
through an increase in exports, and thus to entice investors back into the 
country. A glance at the history of these programmes shows, however, that B 
alongside the weaker sections of society B the environment is supposed to make 
all the sacrifices for an export upturn. True, the removal of environmentally 
damaging subsidies and the liberalization of markets do generally promote a 
more efficient use of resources. But the rate of exploitation soon increases with 
the mobilization of raw materials and agricultural produce for export; land 
demand and pesticide use rise together with the switch over to cash crops; and 




the new exporters= rights to natural resources collide with the hereditary rights of 
less endowed sections of the population to use forests, water and land; the poor 
are pushed to the sidelines, and compelled by rising prices to plunder marginal 
ecosystems for their survival. In this connection, a number of studies have 
concluded that the negative environmental effects of structural adjustment 
programmes far outweigh the positive benefits (Kessler and Van Dorp 1998). 
 
It is not uncommon, however, for the law of supply and demand to cancel out 
the fruits of the export drive. Prices often fall as demand increases on the 
commodity markets, and once more the lower earnings have to be offset by 
greater export volumes. Should the recipient countries also be hit by a financial 
crisis, both demand and commodity prices come under renewed pressure. This is 
precisely what happened after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Commodity 
prices on the world market slid lower and lower B by more than 25 per cent 
within a year (Die Zeit, 24 September 1998). And since the crisis also depressed 
demand in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Malaysia, the price spiral 
kept moving downward and forcing dependent countries to intensify the 
exploitation of raw materials for export. Thus money flows overshadow 
commodity flows in quite a special way during periods of economic downturn. 
 
Vanishing distance and the transport effect  
The sudden awareness of living in a shrinking world may well be the 
fundamental human experience in the age of globalization. The satellite image of 
the blue planet visually presents what things are tending towards in reality: all 
places appear present at the same time. While distance between places becomes 
insignificant, the same time comes to prevail everywhere: space vanishes, time 




tourists, managers and scientists, less and less importance attaches to distance 
and, of course, more and more to time. It hardly matters any longer where on the 
globe something happens; what counts is when it happens B at the right time, too 
late, or not at all. Globalization, in all its facets, rests upon the rapid overcoming 
of space, rendering the present ubiquitous without delay. Computers, after all, 
count seconds, but not kilometres. How the earth is shrinking under the sway of 
time, how near everything is and how fast everything goes B it is in such 
experiences that the growing spatio-temporal compactness of the globe becomes 
discernible (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996). 
 
Spatial compression requires transport, whether along physical or electronic 
channels. Electronic networking is the first constitutive element in the process of 
globalization; without online data transfers there would not be the nervous 
system of signal communication that, in lightning-quick reactions, binds 
together events on the globe without consideration of space. If one thinks, 
however, that in 1995 there were 43.6 computers and 4.8 Internet users per 
thousand of the world=s population (UNDP 1998: 167), four-fifths of whom 
lived in the industrialized countries, then it is all too clear that one can speak of 
globalization only in a geographical, and certainly not a social, sense. No more 
than 1 to 4 per cent of the world=s population are electronically linked to one 
another, and no more than 5 per cent have even sat in an aeroplane. From an 
ecological point of view, electronic communication is assuredly less wasteful of 
resources than is physical transport. Yet one should not underestimate the 
additional strain that the construction and maintenance of a digital infrastructure 
place upon the earth=s resources. High-quality materials used in hardware and 
peripherals are obtained through numerous refining processes that impose a 




lot of material, and satellites and relay stations also cannot be had without a 
drain on the environment. Finally, whatever the many prophets of the 
information age merrily predict, electronic networking will in the long term 
probably generate more physical travel than it replaces. Anyone who has 
established close contact with distant places via electronic media will sooner or 
later want to seal the contact face to face. In any event, the main effect is a 
positive feedback between electronic and physical transport systems: 
globalization itself means transport and still more transport. 
 
All forms of economic globalization, outside the international finance markets, 
rely heavily upon physical transport. Everywhere distances are springing up B on 
both the consumption and factor markets, they are growing longer and more 
numerous. T-shirts come from China to Germany and tomatoes from Ecuador to 
the United States; machinery from Europe stands in Shanghai harbour; the 
global class of >symbol analysts= (Castells 1996) keep bumping into one another 
in the airports of OECD countries. After all, the value of world trade has been 
rising by more than 6 per cent a year, roughly twice as fast as the world 
economy itself. Foreign products B from meat to precision machines B play a 
more prominent role in many countries, and even small firms seek their fortune 
on overseas markets. And yet the word >international trade= has a number of false 
associations. It no longer means that nations exchange goods that they 
themselves do not produce B as in the classical exchange of raw materials for 
industrial goods B but that foreign suppliers appear alongside local ones in 
largely OECD-centred trade. They no longer make up for gaps in the local 
supply, but try to oust the local supply either through undercutting or through 
the use of different symbols (Pastowski 1997). Korean cars for Carland 




takes place within industrial branches; that is, the same commodities are being 
imported and exported at the same time (Daly 1996: 5). The main purpose of 
international goods transport is thus to ensure the competitive presence of many 
suppliers in as many places as possible. 
 
Distance-chopping and rapid transport for high-quality goods and people are 
mainly provided by the international air system. Passenger transport, if it 
continues growing at its present annual rate of 5 per cent, will double every 15 
years, and although by now roughly a half of air travel is for leisure purposes, 
the geography of economic globalization is reflected in the increased flow. 
Between 1985 and 1996, the income of airline companies grew sevenfold on 
routes within China and threefold within South-East Asia and between Europe 
or North America and North-East Asia, whereas on other routes there was at 
most a twofold increase or sometimes, as in the case of Africa, stagnation 
(Boeing 1998). Air freight has been rising still faster: after annual growth of 7 to 
12 per cent in the mid-1990s (ibid.), the assumption is that it will now average 
6.6 per cent and add up to a tripling of revenue by the year 2015 B figures 
naturally surpassed by the anticipated growth rate for international express 
services, where DHL and similar firms reckon on an annual increase of 18 per 
cent.  
 
Without rapidly declining freight costs, the expansion of global markets would 
not have been possible. For such costs must not be a decisive factor, if the 
dynamic of supply and demand is to develop independently of geographical 
location. The more freight costs weigh in the balance, the less worthwhile it 
becomes to use price and innovation to gain an advantage over far-flung 




greater outlays on transport. Only if the costs of overcoming space tend towards 
insignificance can corporate strategies alone determine the choice of location. A 
number of reasons have been given for the relative cheapening of freight. First, 
it is precisely on global markets that transport volume is being constantly 
reduced in relation to a given value of trade. For a computer producer in Texas, 
for example, it matters little whether his hard disks come from Singapore or 
California, as transport costs become less significant, the more the economic 
value of a transported good is independent from its size or weight. In fact, those 
branches of the economy that go in most for >global sourcing= B computers, 
motor vehicles, consumer electronics, textiles B are often not the largest-volume 
traders (Sprenger 1997: 344). Second, containerization and easier transfers 
between modes of transport have greatly increased efficiency (Economist 
1997b). But the third and main reason why distance has been losing its 
resistance is that the price of fuel oil, used in nearly all forms of transport, has 
fallen dramatically since 1980. As a matter of fact, that price is far from 
reflecting the full ecological costs of the production and consumption of oil. For 
all the efficiency gains, transport in the OECD countries is the only sector in 
which CO2 emissions have continued to increase in recent years. Transport also 
requires various facilities: vehicles, highways, harbours and airports, a whole 
infrastructure, which uses a considerable amount of materials and land. Yet most 
of these costs are passed on to society and do not show up in the freight bills. It 
becomes easy to overlook the extent to which the overcoming of geographical 
distance and temporal duration is paid for through the spoliation of nature. 
 
How Economic Globalization Fosters a New Colonization of Nature 
The results of the GATT Uruguay Round, which ended in 1993 with a package 
of trade agreements and the founding of the WTO, included an accord on 




been to dismantle national controls on cross-border trade, it was here a question 
of introducing a new level of regulation. Yet both strategies B deregulation as 
well as re-regulation B were pursued in the name of freedom of trade. The 
contradiction disappears as soon as one realizes that the aim in both cases was to 
create uniform legal foundations for a global economic space. While a plethora 
of national obstacles to the circulation of goods and capital had to be dismantled, 
it was also necessary to establish an international legal framework that would 
give such circulation a powerful helping hand. Factor mobility can be obstructed 
by a mass of laws, but it can also be left hanging in mid-air if there are no laws 
at all. Especially relevant in this respect was the case of property rights in goods 
based on genetic engineering B a case in which legal security had been defective 
in most countries around the world. This was the gap that the agreement on 
>trade-related intellectual property rights= (TRIPS) was designed to close, for 
without it the exploitation of newly available raw materials B the genetic 
material of forms of life B would not have much of a commercial future. 
 
Under the TRIPS agreement, all countries are required to provide legal 
protection for patented inventions of both products and processes, in all fields of 
technology. Industrial patents, of course, have long assured their owners an 
exclusive income from inventions for a certain length of time, but a similar 
system has only slowly come to apply to biological products and processes. The 
protection of a patent is nevertheless indispensable for the commercialization of 
research-intensive products, since only proprietary rights give them a 
commodity status B otherwise they would just be useful objects freely available 
in the public domain. For this reason, a guaranteed property system is the 
legalBsocial corset of a market economy, just as the more or less forcible 




grounds) was the historical prerequisite for the lift-off of agrarian capitalism. If 
the research-intensive products are organisms such as seeds or plants, this raises 
the additional marketing problem that they easily reproduce themselves (Flitner 
1998). Seeds, for example, bring forth plants, which in turn bear the seeds for 
the next sowing. The commodity character of a living organism does not last 
long, therefore; the second generation no longer needs to be bought. But this is 
bad news for any investor, since if commodities can reproduce themselves, it 
means that the reproduction of capital is on shaky ground. That leaves just two 
possibilities. Either their reproducibility is curtailed (for example, through the 
insertion of >terminator genes=), or patents allow fees to be charged for the use of 
a technologically modified living process. 
 
Patents to genetic innovations ensure the economic control of >life industries= 
over modified organisms and their offspring. Only through the establishment of 
proprietary rights over cells, micro-organisms and organisms does the genetic 
material of the living world become available to be marketed. Patents empower 
firms to take ownership of parts of the natural realm, to turn it into an economic 
resource, and as far as possible to monopolize it so that no one can use it unless 
they pay for an approved purpose. Life patents thus play for >life industries= the 
same role that land deeds played for emergent agrarian capitalism. They define 
ownership, keep other users away, and establish to whom the benefits of use 
should accrue. Activities such as planting, animal-raising or curative treatment, 
which used to be part of the public domain, thus come increasingly under the 
control of corporations. Whereas colonialists used to appropriate mineral or land 
resources by physically controlling a territory, the genetic engineering firms 






The consequences for plant diversity, however, are likely to be similar. There is 
no need to consider the numerous dangers bound up with an uncontrollable 
spread of transgenic species; even the accidentfree introduction of genetic 
technology into the agriculture of the South would cause a whole range of plants 
to disappear from the evolutionary picture. Whereas agrarian capitalism led in 
many places to monoculture of natural plant varieties, the life industries might 
force specialization in a few genetically optimized, and economically useful, 
plants (rather along the lines of the >Green Revolution= of the 1960s and 1970s) 
(Lappé and Bailey 1998). In the fierce competition for markets that is likely to 
ensue, non-industrial and local strains would fall by the wayside B which would 
undermine food security, especially for poorer people without the means to 
purchase industrial produce. All plants other than a few strains capable of large-
scale cultivation would be lost. A global system of legal patents for genetic 
inventions, which incorporated and irrevocably modified parts of the human 
biological heritage for commercial ends, would threaten to result in nothing less 
than a simplification of the biosphere. 
 
How Economic Globalization Changes the Geography of Environmental 
Stress 
In recent years, more and more salmon dishes B fresh, smoked or grilled B have 
been appearing on German menus, almost as if it were.150 a fish from local 
waters. By now Germans consume nearly 70 million kilos a year of the favoured 
fish, which is brought from farms in Norway or Scotland to supermarket 
displays (Oppel 1999). But as in the mass farming of any other creature, large 
quantities of feed have to be supplied B to be precise, five kilos of wild deep-




feed salmon for consumption. This raw material is mostly caught off the Pacific 
coast of South America, where catches are declining because of overfishing, and 
it is then turned into meal in Peruvian harbour towns that are in danger of 
suffocating in the gaseous, liquid and solid waste matter that results from the 
process. While German consumers can feast themselves on fresh low-calorie 
(and rather expensive) fish, people in Peru are left with pillaged seas and filthy 
dirty towns. 
 
This example shows how a lengthening of the supply chain can shift the 
ecological division of labour between countries of the South (and East) and 
those of the North. For economic globalization does not mean that the costs and 
benefits of economic activity are globalized. On the contrary, it is more likely 
that extension of the value-creation chain to different locations around the world 
will bring a new allocation of advantage and disadvantage. When a production 
process is divided up among different countries and regions, a tendency soon 
appears to separate costs and benefits by redistributing them up and down the 
chain. Anyway it would be wrong to imagine that the worldwide networking of 
offices, factories, farms and banks is accompanied by a decentralization of all 
functions from production and planning to finance, not to speak of the collection 
of profits (Sassen 1996). Despite many attempts to increase the autonomy of 
sub-units, the opposite is generally the case: that is, the diversification of 
economic activities leads to a concentration of control and profit at the nodal 
points of the network economy (Castells 1996). The flux of investment into 
distant countries is offset by a reflux of power and profits to the originating 
country, or, more precisely, to the >global cities= of the North. As special export 
zones multiply in Bangladesh, Egypt or Mexico, where cheap labour, tax breaks 




the limit for the towers of banks and company offices in Hong Kong, Frankfurt 
or London. 
 
The changed distribution of economic power goes together with a change in how 
the pressure on the environment is distributed across geographical space. If 
power, in an ecological sense, is defined as the capacity to internalize 
environmental advantages while externalizing environmental costs, then it may 
be supposed that the lengthening of economic chains will start a process that 
concentrates advantages at the upper end and disadvantages at the lower end. In 
other words, the environmental costs incurred within the transnational value-
creation chains will become especially high in the countries of the South and 
East, while the post-industrial economies will become ever more 
environmentally friendly. Or to use an analogy (with the salmon example in 
mind), the rich countries will increasingly occupy the upper positions in the food 
chain (where larger volumes of low-value inputs have step-by-step been 
converted into smaller volumes of high-value food), while the developing or 
poorer countries will occupy the middle and lower positions. In fact, along with 
numerous individual examples, a series of highly aggregated data on 
international flows of materials lend credence to this interpretation. Thus, 35 per 
cent of total resource consumption is incurred abroad in the case of Germany, 50 
per cent in Japan, 70 per cent in the Netherlands, and so on (Adriaanse et al. 
1997: 13). The smaller the area of an industrialized country, the greater seems to 
be the geographical separation between the sites of pressure on the environment 
and the sites of consumption benefit. In all these countries, there has been a 
tendency over the past 15 years for a growing proportion of environmental 






In agriculture, Southern regions of the world no longer supply only agrarian 
mass produce as in the days of colonialism, but also supply goods with a high 
dollar value per unit of weight for affluent consumers in the North. Highly 
perishable items such as tomatoes, lettuce, fruit, vegetables and flowers come as 
air freight to Europe from Senegal or Morocco, to Japan from the Philippines, or 
to the United States from Colombia or Costa Rica (Thrupp 1995). As in the case 
of salmon, health-conscious shoppers with an average to high income are only 
too pleased to have a supply that does not depend on the season, while 
plantations and glasshouses in the areas of origin impose irrigation, pesticide use 
and the repression of local farmers. Nor are things much different with shrimp or 
meat production. The breeding of shrimps and prawns in Thailand or India for 
the Japanese and European markets means that people have to wade through 
toxic residue to catch them and that many a mangrove forest has to disappear 
from the scene. More refined consumption in the North at the price of the 
environment and subsistence economics in the South: this pattern has rooted 
itself deeply in the food-produce market since the 1970s. The raising of cattle 
and pigs in Europe draws in manioc or soya both from the United States and 
from countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia or 
Thailand. The old law that the market puts purchasing power before human need 
asserts itself still more powerfully in a world economy beyond frontiers.  
 
Of course, the expansion of the fossil development model into one or two dozen 
aspiring economies in the South and East has done most to change the 
geography of environmental stress. As the newly industrialized nations entered 
the age fuelled by fossil resources, the possibility presented itself of stretching 




of world output has thus been growing (and the OECD=s slowly declining) in 
primary industry, metalworking and chemicals (Sprenger 1997: 337; Mason 
1997), rising in the last of these from 17 per cent in 1990 to 25 per cent in 1996 
(French 1998: 27). What is happening is not so much migration for 
environmental reasons as a redistribution of functions within the world 
economy. The stages of an international production chain that put most pressure 
on the environment are usually in less-developed regions, while the cleaner and 
less material stages tend to be in the G-7 countries. In the aluminium industry, 
for instance, the quarrying of bauxite takes place in Guyana, Brazil, Jamaica and 
Guinea (along with Australia). The actual smelting of the aluminium, which is 
the next stage along, moved more and more in the 1980s from the North to 
countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Indonesia or Bahrain, while the research 
and development stage remained chiefly located in the OECD area (Heerings 
and Zeldenrust 1995: 33). Despite higher use overall, the production of 
aluminium grew strongly in Japan and weakly in Europe; imports from the 
South filled the gap (Mason 1997). 
 
A look at the computer branch further along shows just how much high-tech 
industry lives off the new ecological division of labour. In the case of 22 
computer companies in the industrialized countries, more than half of their 
(mostly toxic) microchip production is located in developing countries (French 
1998: 28). Does this not show in outline the future restructuring of the world 
economy? The software economies of the North will pride themselves on their 
plans for a cleaner environment, while the newly industrialized economies will 
do the manufacturing and contend with classical forms of water, air and soil 
pollution, and the poorer primary economies will do the extracting and 






Which and Whose Globalization? 
Globalization is not a monopoly of the neo-liberals: the most varied actors, with 
the most varied philosophies, are also caught up in the transnationalization of 
social relations; indeed the ecological movement is one of the most important 
agents of global thinking. Accordingly, the image of the blue planet B that 
symbol of globalization B conveys more than just one message. The imperial 
message of collapsing frontiers always found itself confronted with the holistic 
message of the planet=s finite unity. A clear line can be drawn from Earth Day 
1970 (often seen as the beginning of the American ecological movement) to the 
United Nations conference on world climate held in Kyoto in 1997. In the 
squares where people assembled on that first Earth Day, speakers and 
demonstrators underpinned their demands for comprehensive environmental 
protection with photographs of the earth taken less than a year before from the 
surface of the moon. And nearly thirty years later, the emblem of the planet was 
prominently displayed on the front of the conference hall where, for the first 
time, the world=s governments entered into legally binding commitments to limit 
pollution levels. That picture shows the earth as a single natural body binding 
human beings and other forms of life to a common destiny; it globalizes our 
perception both of nature and of the human story. Only with that image did it 
become possible to speak of >one earth= or >one world= in the true sense of the 
term. For neither the name of the environmental association Friends of the Earth, 
nor the title of the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future (WCED 1987), 
would have meant much without that photo of the planet. 
 




produce a way of seeing that places local action within a global framework. The 
picture shows the outer limits of the living space of everyone who looks at it. 
Does not everyone know that, if only the image was sufficiently enlarged, he or 
she would be able to find himself or herself on it? For the observing subject 
cannot be separated there from the observed object; in scarcely any other 
example is self-reference so inextricably woven into the image. This visual 
superimposition of global and individual existence has shifted the cognitive and 
moral coordinates of our perception of ourselves. The consequences of an 
action, it suggests, may extend to the edges of the earth B and everyone is 
responsible for them. All of a sudden, car drivers and meat buyers are linked to 
the greenhouse effect, and even a hairspray or an air ticket is seen as having 
overstepped the global boundaries. >Think globally, act locally=: this electoral 
slogan of the ecological movement has played its part in creating a >global 
citizen= who internalizes the earth=s limits within his or her own thinking and 
action. The narrative of limitation derives its moral force from this association of 
planet and subject in a common drama. The ecological experience is thus 
undoubtedly one dimension of the experience of globalization, because it 
overturns people=s conventional notion that they live and act in national political 
and social spaces that are clearly demarcated and separated from one another 
(Beck 1997: 44). 
 
Yet the ecological movement cannot escape the fact that, however provisionally, 
the imperial message has won through. One sign of this is the way in which 
multinational corporations have almost completely seized for themselves the 
image of the blue planet. The perception of the world as a homogeneous space, 
visible and accessible all the way across, has everywhere become hegemonic. 




and to grab whatever it fancies B exactly as if there were no places, no 
communities, no nations. The mechanisms of GATT, NAFTA and the WTO 
were born in the spirit of frontier demolition. They codify the world as a freely 
accessible economic arena, in which economics enjoys the right of way. The 
newly established rules are designed to proclaim transnational corporations as 
sovereign subjects within global space, exempt from any obligation to regions or 
national governments. State protectionism is thereby abolished, only to be 
replaced by a new protectionism that favours corporations. Transnational 
partnerships are entitled to claim all sorts of freedoms and rights, while 
territorial states B not to mention citizens or civic associations B have to take 
second place. 
 
When people look back on the last century of this millennium, they will be 
forced to conclude that Rio de Janeiro was pretty good on rhetoric, but 
Marrakesh was taken in real earnest. Here the UN conference on the 
environment held in Rio in 1992 stands for a long series of international 
agreements B notably the conventions on climate and biodiversity B that were 
supposed to steer the world economy in less ecologically harmful directions. 
Marrakesh stands for the founding of the World Trade Organization after the 
end of the GATT Uruguay Round, and for the growing importance of the IMF as 
a shadow government in many countries. There the basis was laid for an 
economic regime in which the investment activity of transnational actors would 
be free of regulation anywhere on the globe. These transnational regimes B the 
environmental and the economic B are attempts to give a politicalBlegal 
foundation to transnational economic society, but the two stand in marked 
contradiction to each other. The environmental regime is concerned with 




exploit it; the environmental agreements are based on respect for natural limits, 
the economic agreements on the right to carry through economic expansion 
successfully. Paradoxically, moreover, they wager on different systems of 
responsibility and accountability. On the one hand, the environmental 
agreements appeal to sovereign states as responsible entities that are supposed to 
uphold the public good in their territory. On the other hand, the economic 
agreements assume sovereign, transnationally active corporations that belong to 
no territory and are therefore responsible to no state. Already today the world=s 
hundred largest economies comprise 49 countries and 51 corporations 
(Anderson and Cavanagh 1997: 37). 
 
It is therefore not clear how the conflicting messages that appropriate the image 
of the blue planet can be reconciled with each other. Even transnational civil 
society has succeeded only on specific occasions in confronting corporations 
with their responsibility towards nature and the overwhelming majority of the 
world=s citizens. If the holistic message stands for >sustainability= and the 
imperial message for >economic globalization=, then it would seem necessary to 
suppose that, however great the synergies at a micro-level, the chasm between 
the two is continuing to widen. But that is the greatness of a symbol: it can hold 
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